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CHAPTER III
Taxes as intergovernmental 
revenues115 
§ 1. Intergovernmental levels 
Fiscal federalism provides for the distribution of functions and fi scal capacity among diff erent levels of government. It concerns fi scal functions such as 
raising revenues and making expenditure decisions. Local governments usually 
need more funds than are usually generated from its own eff orts. Central govern-
ments levy taxes and use this revenue to equalize fi scal capacity of local units. 
Th e fi scal responsibility is mixed among the levels of government. Democratic 
decision making and control are parts of fi scal federalism. Th e relationship be-
tween central and local governments is the starting point for the decentraliza-
tion debate. Th is issue was focused very much at the beginning of the systemic 
transition period in 1990s. Simultaneously, this subject involves the dilemma of 
separating political values and economic effi  ciency. Currently, there is a need 
to devolve authority to lower units for delivery of services, as the lower units 
lack in most instances the fi scal capacities to assume these responsibilities. Th e 
context in which intergovernmental fi scal decisions are made depends on what 
the functions of sub-national units are. According to Sharpe, there are three 
functions of local governments such as defence against abuse of central power, 
provision for popular participation in government decisions, and being an effi  -
115 Research presented in this chapter is also based on the investigation of MTA-DE Pub-
lic Service Research Group (Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Science 
and the University of Debrecen) on Regulation of Local Public Services (2012-2016).
»
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cient provider of services116. Th e dilemma faced is that there is a confl ict between 
how democratic the decision making process should be while still providing 
services at an economical and effi  cient level. Th e Hungarian case shows either 
clear preferences or radical neglecting of the former priorities. 
Fiscal federalism means the distribution of functions among diff erent levels 
of government. It includes the most important fi scal function: raising revenue. 
Local governments usually spend more than their directly obtained revenue. 
Central governments levy taxes on local revenue sources and partly use the real-
ized income. Th us, the fi scal responsibility becomes mixed. Th erefore, democratic 
decision-making and control is indispensable in a democratic system. It is real-
ized by the ruled mechanism of fi scal federalism which involves organizational, 
economic, and fi scal mechanisms at the same time.
In general, fi scal federalism is a means to guarantee eff ective independence 
of sub-national units. Th e national (federal) level always has an infl uence on 
local and regional incomes and spending through the system of taxation, grants 
and regulations. Fiscal federalism provides the linkages between these diff erent 
levels. It provides principles and practical means for eff ective central infl uence 
within the democratic system. Fiscal linkages also exist between the European 
level in the framework of the European Union and member states, including 
their regional and local levels.
Th ere are diff erent reasons which necessitate the need for national infl u-
ence. One stems from the need for fi scal unity of every independent country. 
National taxes are applied in a uniform way so that all citizens are compelled to 
contribute to the national needs. Th e second equalization, which is important 
for the various areas of countries with diff erent social conditions and levels of 
economic development. Th e third one is the impact of externalities, which is 
also substantial. Th e delivery of local functions has an eff ect on other govern-
ment units. Th ese eff ects can be positive in the construction of roads, bridges, 
hospitals, and schools, or perceived to be negative such as in the case of the 
building garbage disposal areas, prisons or nuclear power plants in a particular 
neighbourhood. For this reason, cooperation between diff erent municipalities 
and the coordination of policies between regional and national levels is very 
important. Coordinated fi scal policies help to distribute advantages and disad-
vantages throughout the country on an equitable basis. 
116 J. Sharpe, Local Government: Size, Effi  ciency and Citizen Participation, Strasbourg 
1994, p. 20.
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§ 2. The extent of sub-national ﬁ nance
Th e scope of sub-national fi nance can be measured in diff erent ways. Th e 
more expanded the local and regional fi nancial capacity, the more important 
may be the tasks and responsibilities that are given to these governments. 
Th e total sub-national expenditure is related in many respects to the general 
overall government expenditures. Th is data can be compared with respect to 
general government expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. Th e 
relationship of GDP to government expenditure illustrates the real size of the 
state fi nancial dimension. Th e relationship with general government expenditure 
helps categorize the structure of the state expenditure and its distribution of func-
tions between central and local levels. See Figure 1 showing comparative data.
Figure 1. 
Sub-national government expenditure as a % of total public expenditure and as a % of GDP, 
2012
Source: OECD Regions at a Glance 2013117. 
Th ere are signifi cant diff erences between the Scandinavian countries, which 
traditionally spend more through local governments. Th e politically more con-
117 See on: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932913969, (access date: 29 October 2015).
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servative nations generally limit the allocation of funds to local units. At be-
ginning of the transition period in 90s sub-national responsibility was growing 
in Central European transition countries118. As far as data show this trend has 
already changed in some cases, especially the Hungarian one, because of sig-
nifi cant decrease.
Th e main forms of fi nancial transfers are as follows: taxes, grants and user 
charges. According to the narrower meaning of transfers, they are only grants 
(and subsidies) simply. User charges are unique in this list of revenue collection, 
because require a central or higher government approval.
Taxes are levied centrally or locally. Local taxes go directly to the local gov-
ernment. Th ese revenue sources are typical of a decentralized system. However, 
the amount of local tax revenue may be limited because the national government 
regulates rates of these taxes. Practically all of the central taxes are collected at 
the taxpayer level. Th erefore, in the case of central taxes, collection is a type of 
redistribution or equalization among diff erent municipalities. Municipalities vary 
greatly in their ability to produce tax revenue. Th ey depend on their inhabitants’ 
wealth and local economic factors. Th e more centralized the taxation system , the 
smaller linkage exists between the locally collected sources and local spending. 
A portion of central taxes is oft en a  revenue shared between the national and 
sub-national levels. Th e proportion of shared revenue is signifi cant from the point 
of view of the extent of intergovernmental fi nancial transfers. Tax revenue may 
be shared on the basis of the source, or on the basis of a formula that equalizes 
revenue among the sub-national units. In the fi rst case, the proportion of the 
centralized share is large and it limits the linkage between the locally collected 
sources and public spending decisions. Shared taxes are also used for equalization 
among diff erent units of governments. It is also important between the levels of 
government. It is necessary in the case where the level of self-government does 
not have its own sources or does not have enough sources of revenue. 
Taxes as revenues cannot be understood without grants. Grants are also 
sources of government expenditure but there may not be any linkages between 
the source of the revenue and expenditure. Grants serve diff erent functions in 
the local government fi nance of decentralization. First, the equalization func-
tion guarantees that less wealthy areas can fi nance an acceptable level of services 
despite limited tax resources. Second, the impact of diff erent government func-
tions on areas diff ers considerably from one to another. Th is is the case where 
a main road passes through the residential area which is used by non-residents 
118 R.M. Bird, R.D. Ebel, C.E. Wallich, Decentralization of the Socialist State: Intergov-
ernmental Finance in Transition Economies, Washington 1995, p. 443.
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of the municipality. In this situation externalities can be equalized as benefi ts and 
costs of local government activities spill over the local boundaries and infl uence 
other places, causing unexpected benefi ts or damages. Grants can compensate 
for these impacts.
Grants are made on the basis of specifi c policies. Preferences are prioritized 
and added to other sources from diff erent levels. Th e decisions on transfers are 
decided on in public forums. Rules are decided on in advance as an application 
is required and the specifi c decisions are made within the authority of the unit 
of government. In principle, this is a guarantee against bias and potential lob-
bying activity from special interests. 
In sum, grants serve as a balancing mechanism between the levels of gov-
ernment or diff erent areas of a country by providing preference to poorer areas 
with less revenue. In order not to allow local governments to levy or collect 
taxes at minimal levels and to maximize their grant income, grants can be used 
by central governments to encourage local expenditure for particular purposes. 
Th is pushes municipalities to use their own sources in addition to the grant from 
the central government. Th erefore, the higher unit is responsible for the crucial 
determination of targets for grants. 
User charges are also forms of fi nancing. Th e long history of transition 
countries demonstrates that these sources may also be considered as transfers 
depending on the decision regarding which level of government may collect 
them. In communist countries, most urban services such as water and sewer-
age, central heating, solid waste collection, as well as education and health were 
free or the price was symbolic in the case of rental fl ats or public transport. 
Some services were subsidized centrally, particularly electricity and gas. In the 
process of transformation giving these revenues ‘back’ to local governments has 
become a decision of fi nancial transfers. Th is process is composed of several 
steps. First, starting from the 90s, the prices were to be liberalized in the public 
sector. Th is was important even if the state enterprises were the only providers. 
Second, conditions for competition had to be established. An emerging market 
with privatization for these services parallel with the multiplying number of 
service suppliers provided an opportunity to decide about that application of 
user charges. 
In principle, user charges are good for some diff erent purposes of local 
government. Th ese include:
– covering costs;
– maximizing revenues;
– an incentive for economical use.
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According to the theory, the importance of user charges lies in the fact 
that municipalities can behave as service providers119. It means that the correct 
(roughly marginal cost) price is achieved for public consumers. However, it is 
nearly impossible to introduce user charges in all services. Several conditions 
must be met. First, a measurable output is necessary. For instance, health and 
education costs are diffi  cult to direct toward a specifi c user or benefi ciary. Ben-
efi ts from the services should be measured directly with reference to the user. 
Th is is impossible in some public services like police or fi re protection where 
the benefi ts are not realized or not exclusively realized by the direct recipient of 
the service. Second, the excludability of individuals from receiving the service or 
benefi t is important. In general, persons who do not contribute to the production 
of a service should be excluded from enjoying it. However, this is impossible to 
do with many services such as social care or education. Th ird, the character of 
consumption should be analyzed from the point of view of user charges. Th e 
user charge should be appropriate to the amount consumed. In the case of water 
it would not be appropriate to use a property tax as property does not neces-
sarily relate to the amount of water consumed. Consumers would not adjust 
consumption of water under a property tax, and would actually be encouraged 
to be wasteful. Consequently, a charge based on usage would be more fair and 
would discourage wasteful consumption. Th e implementation of user charges 
is clearly a public policy decision. General taxes can be chosen as well, but the 
question in every case should be which type of transfers is the better to reach 
the preferred policy goal being consistent with basic principles of taxation. 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of transfers in diff erent countries. Revenue 
of general government comprises tax revenues (own-source and shared tax rev-
enue), grants and subsidies, user fees and tariff s, property income, and other 
like social contribution.
In the Visegrad countries, i.e. in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Re-
public the proportion of tax sources is higher than the OECD average. Hungary 
and Poland are under this limit. In contrast, the ratio of grants and subsidies 
is higher. Generally, the smaller the proportion of tax sources, the more grants 
and subsidies are in the local revenue structure. 
119 R.M. Bird, R.D. Ebel, C.E. Wallich, Decentralization of the Socialist State: Intergov-
ernmental Finance in Transition Economies, Washington 1995, p. 443.
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Figure 2.
Source: OECD Regions at a Glance 2013. 
Statlink120: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932914007. 
§ 3. Local Units of Government
According to Sharpe, most of the countries signifi cantly reduced their num-
ber of municipal units in the second half of the twentieth century121. However, 
not all of them. It depended on the model of local self-government. Th e main 
120 Access date: 29 October 2015.
121 J. Sharpe, Local Government..., p. 20.
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impetus for reduction was the belief that by consolidating these units greater 
economy and effi  ciency could be achieved in the delivery of services. Th e val-
ues of economy and effi  ciency dominated over the political units of a size that 
is conductive to citizen participation in local decision making. It is assumed 
that small units of government, population wise, provide for greater democrat-
ic participation and increased power to individuals. In some of the transition 
countries, large numbers of small size local units create service diffi  culties and 
force the intergovernmental fi scal system to provide additional resources than 
might otherwise be necessary. On this challenge diff erent answers have been 
made. Otherwise, Page and Goldsmith classifi ed two basic groups of Western 
European unitary states according to their systems of local government122. In the 
northern region of Western Europe municipal systems are termed integrated. Th is 
means that the political boundaries of local units do not follow the geographical 
boundaries of settlements. Th ey have been adjusted to the rationality of service 
provision. Th is is why a  smaller number of units with larger population have 
been created. Th e large cities are units of local authority as well as geographically 
unifi ed areas. On the basis of this philosophy small local units have been merged 
and large self-governments have been established. In contrast to this model, in 
southern unitary states of Western Europe the reform of the Napoleonic state 
was realized without any organizational integration. Many municipalities exist 
and typically every settlement has its own self-government. However, the service 
providing system capacities are established at diff erent levels of government 
(three or four tier systems) with a relatively wide range of associations among 
small municipalities. Th e autonomy of rural and urban units is very important 
from the political point of view. Th is is called the non-integrated system, under-
lining the administrative character of these systems, as opposed to the defi ned 
autonomy for small communities.
Th ese systems are compared in Table 1, according to the indicator of average 
population of their basic units of local government. 
What is the connection between the level of integration and fi scal capacity 
of the system? To answer this question compare Table 1 with Figure 1. Let us call 
the system in the countries under 10,000 average inhabitants at the basic level of 
local governments a non-integrated system. Th e total fi scal capacity is lower in 
this group in general. Th ere is an exception of the United Kingdom, which is also 
in this cluster, notwithstanding its extremely integrated structure. Th e explana-
tion might be the traditionally limited (but strong in this framework) position 
122 E.C. Page, M.J. Goldsmith, Central and Local Government Relations: A Comparative 
Analysis of West European Unitary States, London 1987, p. 179.
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of the state compared with the public as a  total in this country. Federal states 
are a diff erent issue because Lands, etc. are also subjects of decentralization, but 
these are not additionally represented to our local community based statistics. 
Table 1. Basic units of local governments in the member states 
of the European Union, 2013
Country Number of local governments at the basic level
Average population of 
the basic level
Austria 2 357 ~ 3 500
Belgium 589 ~ 18 000
Bulgaria 264 ~ 26000
Cyprus 523 ~ 1 900
Croatia 576 ~ 8 000
Czech Republic 6 250 ~ 1 600
Denmark 98 ~ 57 000
Estonia 226 ~ 5 600
Finland 336 ~ 16 000
France 36 682 ~ 1 800
Germany 13 299 ~ 6 500
Greece 325 ~ 33 000
Hungary 3 175 ~ 3 200
Ireland 85 ~ 56 000
Italy 8 094 ~ 7 600
Latvia 119 ~ 20 000
Lithuania 60 ~ 59 000
Luxemburg 106 ~ 4 900
Malta 68 ~ 6 900
Netherland 418 ~ 41 000
Poland 2 479 ~ 15 000
Portugal 308 ~ 2 500
Romania 3181 ~ 6 900
Slovakia 2 792 ~ 1 900
Slovenia 211 ~ 9 400
Spain 8 117 ~ 5 800
Sweden 290 ~ 31 000
United Kingdom 466 ~ 136 000
Source123: http://www.ccre.org/en/.
123 Access date: 29 October 2015.
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§ 4. Local Taxation
1.  Tax assignments are based on providing taxing power 
to local jurisdiction 
Th ere are diff erent ways of assignments. One is to give tax basis to self-
governments and allow them to decide for what they spend it. Th is right involves 
also collection and administration of the fi nancial source (own source local 
taxes). Th e other way is when tax bases and rates are assessed by the territori-
ally relevant local governments, but the collection and administration are done 
centrally. Th ese sources are frequently shared between central and local levels 
(shared revenues). Shared revenues are important from the point of view of the 
decentralized autonomy according to the European comparative experience. Th e 
Hungarian development is an example of gradual negligence of this opportunity. 
Table 2 shows elimination of shared taxes in 2010s.
Table 2. Centrally allocated revenues of local expenditures in Hungary, 2011–2016
1000 Million HUF 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Normative grants 582,1 473,1
504,3 574,6 542,4 552,6Normatively addressed 
grants (for functions) 183,8 173,2
Centralized spending 80,9 74,9 43,7 94,3
Supplementary grants 41,7 44,7 56,8 39,2 113,6 107,1
Other grants 17,7 14,0 5,3 7,7 2,0
Addressed grants 63,0 81,9 64,8
Shared revenues with 
regulated equalization 226,3 204,8  – –  – –
Proportion of central 
sources (%) 37,2 40,2 29,9 28,6 26,5 26,5
Local expenditures as a 
% of GDP  11,5 9,3 7,6 7,9 7,4 7,1
Source: Hungarian central budget accounts (2011-2013) and planning  (2014-2016); Eurostat, cited 
Péteri, 2015.
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2. Own revenues of local jurisdiction
Own revenues consist of locally levied taxes, user charges and revenues from 
municipal property. Since the transition, the importance of local taxes has been 
increasing. As far as the Hungarian case is concerned, this process is shown in 
Figure 4. It is visible that the importance of local taxes is increasing. Th is trend 
is continuous also in the 2010s under conditions of functional decrease (because 
central subsidies are diminished). 
Figure 4. 
Source: Horváth, Péteri and Vécsei124. 
Local taxes in Hungary are based on Act C of 1990. Aft er the system trans-
formation there was a fi xed pool of objects by the law, and the selection among 
them was the right of local bodies. In this legal environment property taxes, com-
munal taxes and business tax could be levied. Nowadays, property taxes may be 
levied on buildings and un-built sites. Residents may be burdened by communal 
taxes. Th ere is also an option on tourism tax. Business tax is the best revenue for 
local governments: about 80 % of sources from local taxes is from here. 
124 T. M. Horváth, G. Péteri, P. Vécsei, A helyi forrásszabályozási rendszer Magyarországon. 
Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. LXI., No. 4/2015., pp. 121–147.
 
Local taxes, 1993 Local taxes, 2010 Changes, 1993-2010
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Almost all of the municipalities draw revenue from local taxes. Th e most 
popular form is business tax for municipalities. However, the average amount 
of revenues is very diff erent country-wide according to the inhabitants’ income. 
In rich areas a relevant sum of money may be collected, in poor ones there is 
not enough paying capacity. As in general, it is also a regional problem in this 
country. 
A new phenomenon in the Hungarian system is that local governments are 
entitled to levy taxes on other objects, not prescribing directly in the law. It is 
also prohibited to build up the paying obligation on original local taxes. Th ese 
settlement taxes are levied, depending on the will of representative bodies, on 
diff erent objects such as land, dogs, etc. However, among local revenues, the 
weight of business tax has remained on the top. 
Apart from levying, also collection of local taxes is the right and obligation 
of municipalities. In these circumstances, mayors’ offi  ces work as tax authori-
ties. Th e importance of cooperation is most apparent in the case of business tax 
in order to prevent undertakers from avoiding the fulfi lment of their fi nancial 
obligations. 
3. Type of local taxes in Hungary
Recently, there have been two groups of locally levied taxes in Hungary. 
One is ‘classical’ local taxes as regular sources of decentralization which were 
established in 1990 at the beginning of the system transformation. Th e other 
group consists of so-called ‘settlement taxes’ which come to force from 2015. 
Th ese latter ones are limited as far as spending is concerned.
Classical local taxes are prescribed by central law and they may be chosen 
by representative bodies. In Hungary, these are as follows:
o property taxes
 • building tax
 • tax on un-built sites
o communal taxes
 • communal tax on households
 • tourism tax
o income taxes
 • business tax 
Out of 3178 municipalities 3135 levied at least one of the local taxes in 
2015. Business tax is preferred by most of them (2767), then communal tax on 
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households (2250). Building tax (892), tourism tax (784) and tax on sites (503) 
follow in the list125. 
Settlement taxes are not restricted according to their subject. However, it 
is prohibited to burden the same objects or activities which have already been 
burdened by other laws. Experience shows that, these are most popularly lev-
ied on (agricultural) land and dogs. Th ere are also examples of high buildings, 
agricultural vehicles and local roads126. Th ese sources are allowed to cover only 
purposes of development or social tasks. 
How popular are locally levied taxes? Almost all of the municipalities intro-
duced at least one of classical taxes in the period of the last quarter of century. 
In contrast, the settlement tax is quite unknown and some of the elements of 
the regulation are under discussion. Out of total 3178 local governments only 
116 are involved. Th at is why municipalities seem to be still quite reluctant to 
levy this type of taxes because they must be afraid of legal confl icts.
125 P. Bordás, Ki mint vet, úgy arat – de lesz mit? Gondolatok a települési adó bevezetéséről, 





Comparing models of revenue systems in local regimes in Hungary 
Source: Edited by the author (T.M.H.).
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Currently, local taxes simply supply revenues from the bottom, which, in 
turn, are supplemented by the sources from the top. Th e decentralization option 
for representative bodies is more and more restricted in this country, neglecting 
seriously the tradition of system transformation in the period of 1990–2006. 
Changes took place formally in 2011. Th e new system of fi scal regulation started 
on 1 January 2013. Old and new models are compared in Figure 5.
As it is seen in Figure 5, shared tax income revenues disappeared, only 
symbolic amount remained at a local level. Th e largest one is 40 percent of the 
centrally levied but locally collected vehicle tax. Notwithstanding this one and 
some other smaller items, centrally defi ned transfers are introduced instead. 
Grants have also been changed. Th ey used to be normative but now they are 
not. Some of local (settlement) taxes are restricted only to allowed spending. 
With reference to the taxing process, local authorities preserved their collection 
power. Th erefore, mayors’ offi  ces remained tax authorities. 
However, as Figure 5 shows, fi nancial sources have already become very 
centralized. Taxing power as basic criteria of local self-governance has been 
restricted. Independence of local decisions is limited especially from the fi nan-
cial point of view. Local authorities used to be local governments but now they 
are not, and we can say that in Hungary there are simply dependent agencies.
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